Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Amicus Briefs

Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics

3-16-2015

Richard E. Glossip v. Kevin J. Gross
Bruce Green
Stein Center for Law and Ethics

Faith Gay
Quinn Emanuel

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/stein_amicus
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Green, Bruce and Gay, Faith, "Richard E. Glossip v. Kevin J. Gross" (2015). Amicus Briefs. 7.
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/stein_amicus/7

This Amicus Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Amicus Briefs
by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

No. 14-7955
IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
————
RICHARD E. GLOSSIP, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
KEVIN J. GROSS, et al.,
Respondents.
————
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit
————
BRIEF FOR THE LOUIS STEIN CENTER FOR
LAW AND ETHICS AT FORDHAM UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
————
BRUCE A. GREEN
STEIN CENTER FOR LAW
AND ETHICS
150 W. 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
(212) 636-6851

FAITH E. GAY
Counsel of Record
MARC L. GREENWALD
ELLYDE R. THOMPSON
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
& SULLIVAN, LLP
51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
New York, NY 10010
(212) 849-7000
faithgay@quinnemanuel.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae
March 16, 2015
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................

iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .....................

1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT ....................................................

2

ARGUMENT ........................................................

4

I. HISTORICALLY, PUBLIC AWARENESS
OF THE UNNECESSARY RISK OF
PAIN AND SUFFERING OF A PRIOR
EXECUTION METHOD HAS CAUSED
STATE LEGISLATURES TO ADOPT A
NEW METHOD.........................................

4

II. IN SWITCHING TO LETHAL INJECTION, LEGISLATURES DELEGATED
IMPLEMENTATION
OF
THE
METHOD TO PRISON OFFICIALS
WHO
ADOPTED
PROCEDURES
WITHOUT MEDICAL STUDY OR
MEANINGFUL ANALYSIS. ....................

12

A. The Development Of Lethal Injection
Protocols Lacked Any Reasoned
Consideration.......................................

12

1. Oklahoma’s Adoption Of Lethal
Injection ..........................................

12

2. Widespread Adoption Of The
Three-Drug Protocol.......................

16

(i)

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
B. State Prison Officials Continue To
Follow The Same Historical Pattern
In Relying Upon Insufficient Scientific And Medical Study In Modifying
Lethal Injection Protocols ...................

18

1. The Use Of A One-Drug Protocol ..

19

2. A Shift In The Drugs Used ............

22

III. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF PRISON
OFFICIALS’ ADMINISTRATION OF
LETHAL INJECTION IS NECESSARY
TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT ..........................

26

A. Judicial Examination Of Modifications
To Protocols Is Necessary Because
The Actions Of Prison Officials Are
Not Subject To Public Scrutiny And
Oversight .............................................

26

B. The Delegation Of Lethal Injection
Procedures To Prison Officials Permits
Corrective Revision Of Protocols To
Ensure Compliance With The Eighth
Amendment .........................................

30

CONCLUSION ....................................................

33

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Page(s)

Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen,
181 S.W.3d 292 (Tenn. 2005) .......................

32

Arthur v. Thomas,
No. 2:11-cv-438-WKW, 2015 WL 224738
(M.D. Ala. Jan. 15, 2015) .............................

24

Baze v. Rees,
553 U.S. 35 (2008)
................ 1, 2, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 27, 28, 29, 31
Beardslee v. Woodford,
395 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2005) ...................... 13, 17
Bowling v. Kentucky Dep’t of Corr.,
301 S.W.3d 478 (Ky. 2010) ...........................

32

Bryan v. Moore,
528 U.S. 1133 (2000) ....................................

1, 8

Bryan v. Moore,
528 U.S. 960 (1999) ......................................

1, 8

Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehabilitation v.
Superior Ct. of Marin Cnty.,
No. A129540, 2010 WL 3621873
(Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2010) .......................

19

Campbell v. Wood,
18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994) ..........................

5, 6

Cook v. FDA,
733 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ..........................

22

Dawson v. State,
554 S.E.2d 137 (Ga. 2001) ............................

9

Evans v. State,
914 A.2d 25 (Md. 2006) ................................

17

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Fierro v. Gomez,
77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996) ..........................

11

Fierro v. Gomez,
519 U.S. 918 (1996) ......................................

11

Fierro v. Terhune,
147 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1998) ......................

11

Gray v. Lucas,
710 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1983) ......................

10

Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976) ......................................

12

Harbison v. Little,
511 F. Supp. 2d 872 (M.D. Tenn. 2007),
rev’d, 571 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2009) .............. 20, 28
Hill v. McDonough,
547 U.S. 573 (2006) ...................................... 31, 32
Hill v. Owens,
738 S.E.2d 56 (Ga. 2013) ..............................

32

Hobbs v. Jones,
412 S.W. 3d 844 (Ark. 2012) ........................

16

Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199 (2007) ......................................

32

In re Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436 (1890) ...................................... 5, 7, 9
In re Lombardi,
741 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2014),
reh’g denied, 741 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1790 (2014) ..............

23

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Malloy v. South Carolina,
237 U.S. 180 (1915) ......................................

6

Morales v. Cate,
Nos. 3:06-cv-00219, 3:06-cv-926, 2010 WL
3751757 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2010) ..............

19

Morales v. Hickman,
415 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2006) ........

19

Morales v. Hickman,
438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006) ........................

19

Morales v. Hickman,
546 U.S. 1163 (2006) ....................................

19

Morales v. Tilton,
465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006) .......... 19, 28
Muhammad v. State,
132 So.3d 176 (Fla. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 894 (2014) ...........................................

24

Nelson v. Campbell,
541 U.S. 637 (2004) ......................................

31

In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig.,
994 F. Supp. 2d 906 (S.D. Ohio 2014) ..........

24

Pavatt v. Jones,
627 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 2010) .................... 23, 27
Robinson v. Shanahan,
755 S.E.2d 398 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) ...........

22

Sims v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.,
157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 409
(Cal. Ct. App. 2013) ......................................

32

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
State v. Gee Jon,
211 P. 676 (Nev. 1923) ................................. 9, 10
State v. Mata,
745 N.W.2d 229 (Neb. 2008) ........................

9

State v. Rivera,
No. 04CR065940, 2008 WL 2784679
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 10, 2008) ............... 20, 21
Stewart v. LaGrand,
526 U.S. 115 (1999) ......................................

11

Taylor v. Crawford,
No. 2:07-cv-04129, 2006 WL 1779035
(W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006),
rev’d 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007) .............

28

Warner v. Gross,
776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2015) ...................... 24, 25
Wellons v. Comm’r Ga. Dep’t of Corr.,
754 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2014) ....................

23

Whitaker v. Livingston, 732 F.3d 465
(5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom.,
Yowell v. Livingston, 134 S. Ct. 417 (2013) .

23

Wilkerson v. Utah,
99 U.S. 130 (1878) ........................................

5

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
18 U.S.C. § 3596 ...............................................

16

2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch 2000-2 (West) ..

8

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ...............................................

31

vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
An Act Relating to Criminal Procedure;
Amending 22 O.S. 1971, Section 1014; and
Specifying the Manner of Inflicting
Punishment of Death, and Making
Provisions Separable, S.B. 10, 36th Leg.,
1st Sess. (Okla. 1977) (Okla. 1977) ..............

14

Fla. Stat. § 922.105 ............................................ 8, 32
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1014 ........................

14

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-114(e)(2) ..................

29

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.180 ..................

6

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Allen Huang, Hanging, Cyanide Gas, and the
Evolving Standards of Decency: The Ninth
Circuit’s Misapplication of the Cruel and
Unusual Clause of the Eighth Amendment,
74 OR. L. REV. 995 (1995) .............................

10

Christopher Q. Cutler, Nothing Less than the
Dignity of Man: Evolving Standards,
Botched Executions and Utah’s Controversial Use of the Firing Squad, 50 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 335 (2003).........................................

5

Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are
Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV.
319 (1997) ............................................. 7, 8, 10, 16
Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution An
Unconstitutional Method of Execution? The
Engineering of Death Over the Century,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 551 (1994) ..............

7

viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection
Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled
the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49
(2007) ................................ 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 30
Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures
Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox
Behind State Uses of Electrocution
and Lethal Injection and What it Says
About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63 (2002)
................................. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 18
Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos
Post-Baze,
102
GEO.
L.J.
1331
(2014) ........................ 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28
Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and
Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L.
REV. 1367 (2014) ............. 15, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 30
Execution List 2014, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
execution-list-2014 ...................................... 24, 25
Jack Leonard & Maura Dolan, California
Calls Off Brown Execution, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/la
now/2010/09/california-calls-off-brown-exe
cution.html (Sept. 29, 2010 4:25 p.m.) .........

19

Jim Killackey, Execution Drug Like
Anesthesia, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 12,
1977 ...............................................................

17

ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Kelly Catalfamo & Michelle L. Price, Utah
Lawmakers Vote to Allow Firing Squad,
ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/US/
wireStory/lawmakers-vote-state-firingsquad-29542718 (Mar. 11, 2015)..................

29

Maura Dolan, California Will No Longer
Pursue Three-Drug Lethal Injections, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, http://articles.latimes.com/
2013/jul/10/local/la-me-ln-lethal-injection20130710 (Jul. 10, 2013) ..............................

22

OKLA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, THE EXECUTION
OF CLAYTON D. LOCKETT: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (2014) ...........................................

24

Order, Wood v. Ryan, No. 2:14-cv-01447NVW (D. Ariz. July 24, 2014), ECF
No. 34 ............................................................

24

Persons Executed Since 1904 in Washington
State, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS,
http://www.doc.wa.gov/offenderinfo/capital
punishment/executedlist.asp .......................

6

RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1991)...............................

8

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE
AND REPORT THE MOST HUMANE AND
PRACTICAL METHOD OF CARRYING INTO
EFFECT THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IN
CAPITAL CASES (1888) ...................................

7

ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
1949-1953 REPORT (1953) .............................

18

x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Sean Murphy, Nitrogen Gas Executions
Approved By Oklahoma, ABC NEWS,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/nitrog
en-gas-executions-approved-oklahomahouse-29354885 (Mar. 3, 2015) ....................

29

Simon Berlyn, Execution By the Needle, NEW
SCIENTIST, Sept. 15, 1977 .............................

17

State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection ..........

22

STEPHEN
TROMBLEY,
THE
EXECUTION
PROTOCOL: INSIDE AMERICA’S CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT INDUSTRY (1992) .....................

17

STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN
AMERICAN HISTORY (2003) ................ 5, 7, 8, 10, 13
Tim Barker, Author of Lethal Injection Bill
Recalls His Motive, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 7,
1990. ..............................................................

13

Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment, 2013 –
Statistical Tables, Bureau of Justice
Statistics Bull. No. NCJ 248448, U.S.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Dec. 19,
2014).............................................................. 4, 16
William J. Wiseman, Confessions of a Former
Legislator, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, June 2027, 2001 .........................................................

14

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1
The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics is based
at Fordham University School of Law and sponsors
programs, develops publications, supports scholarship
on contemporary issues of law and ethics, and
encourages professional and public institutions to
integrate moral perspectives into their work. Over the
past decade, the Stein Center and affiliated Fordham
Law faculty have examined the ethical dimensions of
the administration of criminal justice, including the
ethical and historical dimensions of the death penalty
and execution methods. The Stein Center has submitted amicus briefs in two prior cases in which
the Court has been asked to examine methods of
execution: Bryan v. Moore, 528 U.S. 960 (1999), cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted, 528 U.S. 1133
(2000), which the Court had granted to consider
whether electrocution violated the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), in which the Court
examined the constitutionality of lethal injection as
implemented in Kentucky and in which the Court
cited the Stein Center brief.
Implementation of lethal injection as a method of
execution implicates ethical questions important to
the Stein Center. The evolution of execution methods
in the United States generally suggests a public
consensus opposed to the infliction of severe pain and
1

Pursuant to Rule 37.3, the parties have consented to the filing
of this brief. Letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk. No
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no
counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund
the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than
amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made a monetary
contribution to its preparation or submission.
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suffering in the course of executing individuals
sentenced to death. At the same time, it is doubtful
whether in practice execution methods achieve that
goal. In the context of lethal injection, there are
serious concerns whether prison officials, legislators,
and courts have responded to the risks associated with
the implementation of lethal injection in an ethical
manner.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The landscape of the implementation of lethal
injection has changed greatly in the seven years since
this Court’s decision in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35
(2008). During this time, States have moved away
from the three-drug protocol synonymous with lethal
injection since its adoption—a protocol to which
States adhered for decades. Such changes have been
implemented not by state legislatures, but by prison
officials charged with carrying out lethal injection
executions. This brief analyzes how the history of
execution methods informs the Court’s analysis of
Petitioners’ challenge to Oklahoma’s most recent
revision to its lethal injection protocol.
(1) As the Court recognized in Baze, the history of
execution methods in the United States demonstrates
that States moved toward new methods in an effort
to execute inmates in a humane manner free from
unnecessary pain. Historically, laws switching execution methods came about as society became more
aware of the risks associated with a certain execution
method, e.g., when electrocutions produced horrific
scenes of burning flesh, or when lethal gas resulted in
the slow asphyxiation in the gas chamber. Such
legislative action meant this Court rarely had occasion

3
to examine the constitutionality of an execution
method under the Eighth Amendment.
(2) When States adopted lethal injection as an
execution method, the great majority of States left
statutes purposefully vague as to the lethal injection
procedure. Oklahoma developed a three-drug lethal
injection protocol in 1977. That protocol, which nearly
every lethal injection State and the federal
government subsequently copied, lacked adequate
medical or scientific basis. Notwithstanding the
Court’s decision in Baze approving the three-drug
protocol, States have moved away from the original
three-drug protocol in recent years. Such changes
resulted not from deliberate evaluation of the merits
of modified protocols or from legislative enactment,
but from court decree or practical considerations.
(3) Because States delegate the details of lethal
injection executions to prison officials, protocols are
not subject to public scrutiny and oversight. On the
one hand, this system leaves departments of
corrections with the ability to create and implement
alternatives to existing procedures. On the other
hand, prison officials have continued to adopt
protocols lacking sufficient scientific or medical basis.
The responsibility for ensuring that executions do not
risk unnecessary cruelty or lingering death thus lies
with the courts. Judicial review of such protocols is
necessary to ensure that administration of lethal
injection comports with the Eighth Amendment.

4
ARGUMENT
I. HISTORICALLY, PUBLIC AWARENESS OF
THE UNNECESSARY RISK OF PAIN AND
SUFFERING OF A PRIOR EXECUTION
METHOD
HAS
CAUSED
STATE
LEGISLATURES TO ADOPT A NEW
METHOD.
As is well documented, the federal government and
every State that has the death penalty employ lethal
injection as the method of execution. Prior to lethal
injection, States switched methods when pre-existing
methods were shown in practice to embody a high
risk of painful or lingering death. In large part, the
coordinated move from one execution method to
another took place by legislative dictate rather than
judicial decree. See generally Deborah W. Denno,
When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling
Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal
Injection and What it Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
63 (2002). With the exception of a few States that
permitted use of the firing squad, the general
historical trend in the United States led to the
transition from hanging to electrocution, which gave
way briefly to reliance on the gas chamber, before
settling on lethal injection.
Hanging. In the mid-nineteenth century, States
typically favored the use of hanging as the method of
execution, while three States allowed for execution by
firing squad.2 By 1853, hanging had become “the
2

No State currently relies on the firing squad as the primary
method of execution and only Utah and Oklahoma still authorize
the firing squad as an alternative to lethal injection under some
limited circumstances. See Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment,
2013 – Statistical Tables, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bull. No.
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nearly universal form of execution in the United
States and 48 States imposed death by this method.”
Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119, 114 S. Ct. 2125,
2125 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). The method required “no equipment beyond
a rope and a high structure,” and “no expertise beyond
the ability to tie a knot.” STUART BANNER, THE DEATH
PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 44 (2003). Despite
the seeming simplicity of the method, hanging had
begun to fall out of favor by the late 1800s, after the
public witnessed gruesomely botched hangings that
involved decapitations and slow strangulations.3
Societal awareness of the “[b]ungled hangings [that]
often caused intense pain and on occasion failed to kill”
led legislatures to search for a more humane method
of execution. BANNER, supra, at 175; In re Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890) (describing the quest to
determine “‘whether the science of the present day’”
could find a “less barbarous manner” of execution than
hanging) (quotation marks omitted).
By 1994, only two States employed hanging as an
execution method. See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662,
NCJ 248448, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, at 4 & 7 tbl. 2
(Dec. 19, 2014), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=
pbdetail&iid=5156; Christopher Q. Cutler, Nothing Less than the
Dignity of Man: Evolving Standards, Botched Executions and
Utah’s Controversial Use of the Firing Squad, 50 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 335, 337 (2003) (noting the historical use of the firing squad
but that only a few States had statutes permitting its use). In
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), the Court held that death
by firing squad did not rank among the “cruel and unusual
punishments” banned by the Eighth Amendment, but the Court
did so without “defin[ing] with exactness the extent of the
constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual
punishments shall not be inflicted.” 99 U.S. at 134-36.
3

BANNER, supra, at 172-75.

6
app. B at 726-29 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). In that
year, this Court declined to review a decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
that held that the State of Washington’s use of
hanging as a method of execution did not violate the
Eighth Amendment. Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119
(1994). In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
relied upon the specific protocol Washington had
adopted, which was based on scientific study and
expert analysis undertaken to minimize the risk of an
inhumane death by hanging. Campbell, 18 F. 3d at
687. In spite of the judicial position on hanging,
greater public awareness and deliberation as to the
continuing risk of unnecessary pain and brutality of
hanging caused Washington State to adopt lethal
injection as its default method of execution in 1996.4
Electrocution. Although Washington was slow to
move away from hanging (a pace likely explained in
part by the fact that Washington did not execute
anyone for three decades preceding 1993),5 many
States had moved to a new method of execution at the
turn of the century. By 1915, twelve States had
switched from hanging to electrocution, in reliance
upon the “belief that electrocution is less painful and
more humane than hanging.”
Malloy v. South
Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 185 (1915). Throughout the
early part of the twentieth century, the vast majority
of States turned to the electric chair as the preferred
method of execution. See Campbell, 18 F.3d at app. B
726-29; Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 130 tbl. 2.
4

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.180(1) (requiring lethal
injection unless the inmate elects hanging); see also Denno, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. at app. 2 at 205-06.
5

Persons Executed Since 1904 in Washington State, WASH.
STATE DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, http://www.doc.wa.gov/offender
info/capitalpunishment/executedlist.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).

7
The change from hanging to electrocution began in
New York in the late 1800s, when members of the New
York legislature began investigating the use of electricity in executions. BANNER, supra, at 178; In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 444. At that time, the electric
chair was viewed as a modern method of execution
and, through the use of technology, able to cause a
quick and painless death. See NEW YORK (STATE)
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT THE MOST
HUMANE AND PRACTICAL METHOD OF CARRYING INTO
EFFECT THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IN CAPITAL CASES,
80 (1888).
New York adopted electrocution on the premise that
it presented a more humane method of execution even
though no inmate had ever been executed by the
electric chair and thus New York lacked any evidence
of how the method would work in practice. Denno, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. at 71-74; see generally Deborah W.
Denno, Is Electrocution An Unconstitutional Method of
Execution? The Engineering of Death Over the
Century, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 551 (1994). Indeed,
the electric chair did not even exist at the time New
York switched to the method and “[p]rison officials . . .
faced the task of acquiring machinery that had not yet
been designed.” BANNER, supra, at 181; see id. at 182.
In 1890, this Court permitted the first execution
by electric chair to proceed, relying on New York’s
expressed motivation of finding a more humane
method of execution. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 44749. New York’s execution of Kemmler in 1890 was
plagued with serious problems, but that did not deter
other States from adopting the method. BANNER,
supra, at 186, 189; Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 71-74 &
n.55. By 1930, more than half of the then-active death

8
penalty States employed the electric chair. See
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 15 (1991); Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 130 tbl.
2. As States continued to copy New York’s method,
“prison officials from the later states to adopt the chair
traveled to the earlier states to learn how to construct
and operate the necessary equipment.” BANNER,
supra, at 190. But the problems of New York’s firsttime use of the electric chair persisted, with widely
reported accounts of gruesomely botched electrocutions over the years. See Deborah W. Denno, Getting
to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L.
REV. 319, app. 2.A at 413 (1997) (describing examples
of botched executions); BANNER, supra, at 192-193.
Following a particularly gruesome electrocution in
Florida, this Court agreed to examine the constitutionality of electrocution in the State. See Bryan v.
Moore, 528 U.S. 960 (1999). By that time, public
awareness of the risk that electrocutions would cause
unnecessary pain and lingering death had reached a
high point.6 In early 2000, the Florida legislature
altered its execution method to permit an inmate to
choose between electrocution and lethal injection. See
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 922.105; 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
Ch. 2000-2 (West). As a result, the Court dismissed
the writ as improvidently granted. Bryan v. Moore,
528 U.S. 1133 (2000) (dismissing writ in light of
“recent amendments” to the Florida statute).

6

See Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How
Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
49, 63 (2007) (describing the 1999 botched execution of Allen Lee
Davis, who suffered deep burns and bleeding, color photographs
of which were viewed by millions of people on the Florida
Supreme Court’s website); Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 78-79.

9
In the following years, two state courts ruled
electrocution unconstitutional under state constitutions. In 2001, Georgia held electrocution unconstitutional, explaining “whether a particular punishment is
cruel and unusual is not a static concept, but instead
changes in recognition of the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”
Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 137, 139 (Ga. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Georgia
legislature had abolished electrocution as a method of
execution for capital offenses committed after May 1,
2000, “reflect[ing] societal consensus that the ‘science
of the present day’ has provided a less painful, less
barbarous means for taking the life of condemned
prisoners.” Id. at 144 (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S.
at 444). The Nebraska Supreme Court held electrocution unconstitutional under the Nebraska State
Constitution in 2008, reasoning that “[e]lectrocution’s
proven history of burning and charring bodies is
inconsistent with both the concepts of evolving
standards of decency and the dignity of man.” State v.
Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 278 (Neb. 2008).
The
Nebraska Supreme Court further explained that
States that already had abolished electrocution
through legislative process “have recognized that early
assumptions about an instantaneous and painless
death were simply incorrect and that there are more
humane methods of carrying out the death penalty.”
Id.
Lethal Gas. Not all States initially turned to
electrocution as an alternative to hanging, however.
Early problems with electrocution together with the
continued repugnant nature of hangings caused some
States to experiment with the gas chamber. Nevada,
which had never adopted electrocution, was the first
State to authorize lethal gas in 1921. Denno, 63 OHIO
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ST. L.J. at 83. At the time, Nevada’s deputy attorney
general persuaded two state legislators that the
method would be more humane than hanging or the
firing squad. BANNER, supra, at 196. “Within a week,
apparently without any debate in either house of the
legislature, both houses passed a bill providing for
execution by lethal gas.” Id. The legislature explained
that the switch to lethal gas “sought to provide a
method of inflicting the death penalty in the most
humane manner known to modern science.” State v.
Gee Jon, 211 P. 676, 682 (Nev. 1923). By 1955, ten
additional States had adopted lethal gas. Denno, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. at 83.
Nevada initially sought to rely on lethal gas because
it was the method used in the relatively peaceful
killings of animals. See Gee Jon, 211 P. at 681. But,
again, prison officials were tasked with figuring out
the details of exactly how to carry out the method on
human beings. BANNER, supra, at 197. As with prior
execution methods, the first lethal gas execution did
not go as planned and the hydrocyanic acid prison
officials had chosen to use pooled on the floor of the gas
chamber. Id. at 197-98. Over time, it became clear
that inmates did not die peacefully by breathing in
lethal gas while sleeping. Death lingered and inmates
often urinated on themselves, moaned, twitched, and
painfully convulsed for minutes before finally dying.7
In addition, the gas chamber carried with it lasting
association with the abhorrent mass killings in Nazi
Germany. Allen Huang, Hanging, Cyanide Gas, and
the Evolving Standards of Decency: The Ninth
Circuit’s Misapplication of the Cruel and Unusual

7

See, e.g., Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1058-59 (5th Cir.
1983); see also Denno, 82 IOWA L. REV. at app. 2.B at 425.
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Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 74 OR. L. REV. 995,
1007-08 (1995). The gas chamber fell out of favor.
In 1996, the Ninth Circuit ruled that execution by
lethal gas under California’s protocol constituted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment and deemed the method
unconstitutional. Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th
Cir. 1996), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 519 U.S.
918 (1996). The Ninth Circuit cited to the district
court’s findings that the evidence indicated inmates
would experience extreme pain. Id. at 308-09. This
Court avoided consideration of the constitutionality of
the method when California (which allowed for a
choice between lethal gas and lethal injection)
amended its method of execution statute to set lethal
injection as the default method unless the inmate
chose lethal gas; the Ninth Circuit agreed on remand
that the inmate no longer had standing to challenge
the constitutionality of California’s method of
execution. See Fierro v. Terhune, 147 F.3d 1158, 1160
(9th Cir. 1998). In Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115
(1999), the Court held that a death row inmate had
waived his claim that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited his execution by lethal gas because the
inmate specifically had chosen to be executed by lethal
gas rather than lethal injection. 526 U.S. at 118-19.
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II. IN SWITCHING TO LETHAL INJECTION,
LEGISLATURES DELEGATED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE METHOD TO
PRISON OFFICIALS WHO ADOPTED
PROCEDURES
WITHOUT
MEDICAL
STUDY OR MEANINGFUL ANALYSIS.
Public scrutiny of methods of execution intensified
in the 1970s following the end of a nine-year
execution hiatus while this Court considered the
constitutionality of the death penalty. At that time,
States turned to lethal injection, with Oklahoma
leading the way.
While Oklahoma touted the
humaneness of the method, no evidence existed to
support this conclusion. Oklahoma delegated the
actual details of implementing the method to its
department of corrections, which devised a three-drug
protocol. States and the federal government followed
suit in adopting lethal injection as a method of
execution, in delegating responsibility for the
development of specific protocols to prison officials,
and in utilizing the same three-drug protocol. While
the original three-drug protocol was commonplace for
decades, more States have modified the drugs used in
their execution protocols in the past seven years than
at any point since the method’s adoption.
A. The Development Of Lethal Injection
Protocols
Lacked
Any
Reasoned
Consideration.
1. Oklahoma’s Adoption Of Lethal Injection
As this Court has recognized, “state legislatures
began responding to public calls to reexamine electrocution as a means of ensuring a humane death”
following the Court’s decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428
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U.S. 153 (1976). Baze, 553 U.S. at 41-42 (citing
BANNER, supra, at 192-93, 296-97). Oklahoma, facing
the need to refurbish its rotting electric chair, turned
to lethal injection.8 Oklahoma introduced the first
lethal injection bill in 1977. Baze, 553 U.S. at 41-42;
BANNER, supra, at 297; Beardslee v. Woodford, 395
F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005). Two Oklahoma state
legislators, State Representative Bill Wiseman and
State Senator Bill Dawson, spearheaded the move
toward lethal injection, driven by the inhumanity of
electrocution and the costs associated with it.9
Because the Oklahoma Medical Association refused
to assist with devising the new method of execution,
Wiseman and Dawson consulted with A. Jay Chapman, Oklahoma’s chief medical examiner. Deborah W.
Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine
Has Dismantled The Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 49, 65-66 (2007). Chapman agreed to assist
the legislators even though he admitted he “‘was an
expert in dead bodies but not an expert in getting them
that way.’” Id. at 66. Chapman quickly proposed use
of an intravenous drip of “an ultra-short-acting
barbiturate,” which would cause unconsciousness, “in
combination with a chemical paralytic,” to paralyze
8

BANNER, supra, at 296. Oklahoma had adopted lethal gas as
an execution method in 1951, but provided that electrocution
would be used until the State could build a gas chamber, which it
never did. See Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at app. 2 at 201 n.121.
Construction of the gas chamber was estimated to cost at least
$250,000 and fixing the State’s electric chair was estimated to
cost $50,000. Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 71.
9

See Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 65-66, 71; Tim Barker,
Author of Lethal Injection Bill Recalls His Motive, TULSA
WORLD, Sept. 7, 1990, at A1, available at http://www.tulsa
world.com/archives/author-of-lethal-injection-bill-recalls-his-motiv
e/article_90c3f8c3-22c5-5cd7-8d0c-42fb17378968.html.
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the body’s muscles. Id. at 66-67; see also William
J. Wiseman, Confessions of a Former Legislator,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, June 20-27, 2001, at 6. According
to Chapman, he specifically suggested to the legislators certain drugs for use: sodium thiopental as the
ultra-short-acting barbiturate and chloral hydrate as
the paralytic agent. Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 67.
Dawson also sought input from Stanley Deutsch, the
head of the Oklahoma Medical School’s Anesthesiology Department, in a single phone call. Id. at 67-68;
see also Baze, 553 U.S. at 42. After the call, Deutsch
sent a letter recommending two types of drugs: an
“ultra short acting barbiturate” and a “neuromuscular
blocking drug.” Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 67.
The proposed bill in the Oklahoma legislature did
not include specific drugs or doses based on the input
of either Chapman or Deutsch. Id. No historical
evidence suggests any further consultation with
doctors or scientists, nor any study or consideration of
any of available evidence concerning the risks and
dangers of lethal injection. Id. at 65, 70.
The Oklahoma lethal injection bill introduced in
early 1977 tracked Chapman’s early formulation. An
Act Relating to Criminal Procedure; Amending 22 O.S.
1971, Section 1014; and Specifying the Manner of
Inflicting Punishment of Death; and Making Provisions Separable, S.B. 10, 36th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla.
1977). The bill passed, and was signed into law on
May 10, 1977, making Oklahoma the first state to
authorize execution by lethal injection. Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 22, § 1014.
The language included in Oklahoma’s statute,
however, was intentionally vague and delegated to
prison officials authority to determine how to carry out
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lethal injections. Id. Corrections officials had the
responsibility for determining what drugs to use, what
dosage to give, and who would administer the drugs
and how. See Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 68-69.
Despite his admitted lack of expertise, Chapman again
played a key role in assisting officials in developing the
details of a lethal injection procedure. Denno, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. at 73-75. In light of his role as the
medical examiner, it was perhaps unsurprising that
Chapman was unconcerned with whether the specific
protocol would inflict pain and suffering. Rather,
when asked for the rationale behind his ultimate
recommendation of specific drugs, he ridiculed the
idea that “we should worry that these horses’ patoots
should have a bit of pain, awareness of anything.” Id.
at 74 n.151.
During Chapman’s consultation with the department of corrections behind the scenes, the third drug,
potassium chloride, was added to the two-drug
combination. Id. at 74. Potassium chloride works
in humans to stop the heart, and if an inmate is
not sufficiently anesthetized before receiving the
drug, it is undisputed that it will cause “a conscious
inmate to suffer excruciating pain.” Baze, 553 U.S.
at 113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Moreover, the
second drug—the paralytic agent—would mask the
expression of any pain. See id. at 71 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Denno, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. at 55-56; Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy
and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C.L. REV.
1367, 1377 (2014). In selecting these drugs at the
time, prison officials in Oklahoma stated that “if and
when they have to use the injection law, new and
better drugs may be available.” Deborah W. Denno,
Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331,
1357-60 (2014) (emphasis omitted).
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2. Widespread Adoption Of The Three-Drug
Protocol
Beginning immediately after Oklahoma adopted
lethal injection, other States switched to the method,
before the method ever had been used in an execution.
Baze, 553 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment). Texas adopted lethal injection the very
next day. Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 78. By 1982,
the year in which Texas conducted the first lethal
injection execution, six States had enacted lethal
injection statutes. Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1341 cht.
1. Another fifteen States adopted lethal injection from
1983 to 1988, with seven States doing so in 1983.
Id. That progression continued, with twelve States
switching to lethal injection from 1994 to 2002. Id.;
see also Denno, 82 IOWA L. REV. at 408 tbl. 7, app. 3 at
439; Snell, supra n.2, at 4, 7 tbl. 2; 18 U.S.C. § 3596(a).
Nebraska abandoned electrocution in favor of lethal
injection only in 2009 after the Nebraska Supreme
Court found the electric chair unconstitutional under
the state constitution. Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1342.
Like Oklahoma, other States left their lethal
injection statutes intentionally vague. See Denno, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. at 68-69; Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
at 93. This delegation left the responsibility for
developing execution protocols to corrections officials
who had no specialized expertise. Prison officials thus
had “unfettered discretion to determine all protocol
and procedures, most notably the chemicals to be used,
for a state execution.” Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844,
854 (Ark. 2012) (discussing Arkansas statute).
Ultimately, the federal government and almost
every State that adopted lethal injection as an execution method also adopted the original three-drug
protocol that Oklahoma had developed. Baze, 553 U.S.
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at 43 (noting at least 30 States use the three-drug
combination); Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25, 76-77 &
n.17 (Md. 2006) (similar). But, as this Court recognized,
“it is undisputed that the States using lethal injection
adopted the protocol first developed by Oklahoma
without significant independent review of the
procedure.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 44 n.1; see also
Beardslee, 395 F.3d at 1074 n.11 (noting California’s
protocol was “informally” based on the protocol in
Texas and that “the precise protocol was never
subjected to the rigors of scientific analysis.”).
States copied the three-drug protocol despite the
concerns that arose about it almost immediately. Soon
after Oklahoma adopted the method, Chapman,
Oklahoma’s medical examiner, publicly discussed its
potential dangers. See Jim Killackey, Execution Drug
Like Anesthesia, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 12, 1977, at
1 (“Dr. A. Jay Chapman, state medical examiner, said
that if the death-dealing drug is not administered
properly, the convict may not die and could be
subjected to severe muscle pain.”). When Texas
became the first State to employ the method in 1982,
the Texas warden mistakenly mixed all three drugs
into a single syringe, causing the mixture to turn into
“white sludge.”
See STEPHEN TROMBLEY, THE
EXECUTION PROTOCOL: INSIDE AMERICA’S CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT INDUSTRY 74-75 (1992).
Indeed, the dangers attendant to the particular
sequence of drugs were foreseeable even in 1977. See,
e.g., Simon Berlyn, Execution By the Needle, NEW
SCIENTIST, Sept. 15, 1977, at 676-77 (describing the
likely dangers of pairing a fast-acting barbiturate with
a chemical paralytic, including the “terrifying possibility
. . . that if an insufficient dose of barbiturates were
given in execution,” together with a paralytic, “a
conscious victim would be unable to convey an
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experience of intense suffering”). And before
Oklahoma considered the method, Great Britain’s
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment had issued
a 1953 report that concluded after a five-year study
that lethal injection brought with it serious risks,
ranging from the likely necessity of medical
involvement to the potential difficulties of injecting an
inmate with compromised veins. ROYAL COMMISSION
ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953 REPORT 257-61
(1953); Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 64-65.
In the quarter-century that followed the first lethal
injection execution, state prison officials continued to
use the same lethal injection method, which resulted
in numerous botched executions. Officials stabbed at
inmates, trying to find suitable veins; intravenous
lines infiltrated, sending the lethal chemicals into the
tissue instead of the bloodstream; and inmates gasped
and convulsed, apparently in pain. See, e.g., Denno, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. at app. 1 at 139-41 tbl. 9; Denno, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. at 100-01.
B. State Prison Officials Continue To
Follow The Same Historical Pattern In
Relying Upon Insufficient Scientific
And Medical Study In Modifying Lethal
Injection Protocols.
Although nearly all States relied on the original
three-drug sequence of sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride at the time
this Court agreed to hear Baze, that no longer is true
today. Despite the Court’s sanctioning of Kentucky’s
three-drug protocol, States have moved away from the
three-drug combination in recent years. Such changes
resulted from either court intervention or practical
considerations as opposed to medical or scientific
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study. Regardless of why any single State modified its
protocol, other States often copied the new approach.
1. The Use Of A One-Drug Protocol
When this Court agreed to hear Baze in 2007, many
States were grappling with challenges to lethal injection protocols. In California, for instance, a federal
district court ruled in 2006 that the State could not
carry out the execution of inmate Michael Morales
using its standard three-drug protocol unless it
provided qualified medical personnel in the field of
general anesthesia to ensure that Morales was
unconscious. See Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d
1037, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d per curiam, 438
F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006). As an alternative, the district
court ruled that the execution could proceed if the
State traded the historical three-drug protocol for a
barbiturate-only protocol. Id. The State selected the
alternative after the anesthesiologists scheduled to
participate in the execution withdrew, but the State
was unable to devise a one-drug protocol in time.10
Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974-77 (N.D.
Cal. 2006).
The following year, in September 2007, a federal
district court in Tennessee deemed Tennessee’s lethal
10

The same district court ruled in 2010 that California could
use the one-drug protocol to execute inmate Albert Greenwood
Brown, although that execution did not go forward. Morales v.
Cate, Nos. 3:06-cv-00219, 3:06-cv-00926, 2010 WL 3751757, at *67 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2010) (providing for one-drug protocol); Cal.
Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab. v. Superior Ct. of Marin Cnty.,
No. A129540, 2010 WL 3621873 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2010)
(unpublished); Jack Leonard & Maura Dolan, California Calls
Off Brown Execution, LOS ANGELES TIMES, http://latimesblogs.la
times.com/lanow/2010/09/california-calls-off-brown-execution.html
(Sept. 29, 2010 4:25 p.m.).
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injection protocol, adopted after a 90-day moratorium,
unconstitutional. Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d
872 (M.D. Tenn. 2007), rev’d, 571 F.3d 531 (6th Cir.
2009). The panel constituted to evaluate Tennessee’s
lethal injection protocol had recommended that the
State switch to a one-drug protocol that embodied
fewer inherent risks. Id. at 877-78. But the Tennessee
commissioner of corrections decided to retain the
three-drug method. Id. at 886. In doing so, the
commissioner declined to include any of the additional
safeguards the panel had recommended. Id.
These decisions, however, pre-dated this Court’s
decision in Baze, which approved the three-drug
method. Instead of fortifying the three-drug cocktail,
however, States began to move toward a one-drug
method that the petitioners in Baze had advanced and
which the courts in California and Tennessee had
approved.11
In switching to a one-drug protocol, States this time
followed Ohio. In June 2008, less than two months
after Baze was decided, a state court held that Ohio
could no longer employ the standard three-drug
protocol because the drug combination contravened
Ohio’s own lethal injection statute and therefore violated due process. State v. Rivera, No. 04CR065940,
2008 WL 2784679, slip op. at 1, 9 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
June 10, 2008). The Ohio court emphasized that “the
use of two drugs in the lethal injection protocol (pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride) creates an
unnecessary and arbitrary risk that the condemned
11

In addition, four states have abolished the death penalty
since 2008. See Denno, 102 GEO. L. J. at 1343 n.73. New Mexico,
Connecticut, and Maryland did not make the abolishment of the
death penalty retroactive. Id.
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will experience an agonizing and painful death.” Id.
at 6. The court proceeded to hold that the State’s
implementation of lethal injection should be through
only “a lethal injection of a single, anesthetic drug.”
Id. at 9.
Ohio officially adopted a one-drug protocol using
only sodium thiopental in 2009.12 Prison officials in
other States quickly followed suit, although many
executions ended up using pentobarbital as a
substitute for sodium thiopental. Denno, 102 GEO.
L.J. at 1357-60. Washington State switched to the
one-drug method in 2010, as did South Dakota in
2011. Id. at 1357-60. In 2012, another five states
(Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, and Texas) made
the change and three states did so in 2013 (Arkansas,
Kentucky, and Louisiana). Id. By 2013, prison
officials in one-third of death penalty States had
abandoned the three-drug sequence. Id. at 1360.
Kentucky joined this group even though this Court
had specifically rejected the argument in Baze that
Kentucky should switch to a one-drug protocol, noting
that using a single barbiturate was a method that
“ha[d] not been adopted by any State and ha[d] never
been tried.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 40.
With so many States abandoning the three-drug
protocol, “[i]n 2013, two-thirds of the lethal injection
executions used a one-drug protocol compared to onehalf of the lethal injection executions in 2012.” Denno,
102 GEO. L.J. at 1360. States have continued to move

12

Ohio also permitted use of an alternative two-drug sequence
that it implemented in 2014 in the execution of Dennis McGuire.
Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1357; Berger, 55 B.C.L. REV. at 1387.
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to a one-drug protocol in increasing numbers. 13 See
State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethalinjection (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
2. A Shift In The Drugs Used
At the same time certain States turned to the onedrug method, other States maintained rigid adherence
to a three-drug protocol. All States began modifying
the precise drugs used, however, due to pragmatic
considerations.
Because of drug shortages, prison officials were
forced to make substitutions for the first drug from
the original three-drug sequence, sodium thiopental,
in both one-drug and three-drug protocols. Denno,
102 GEO L.J. at 1362. “In 2009, the last domestic
manufacturer of thiopental stopped making it.” Cook
v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Foreign
manufacturers, aware of the use of the drug in lethal
injections, declined to export the drug to the United
States. Denno, 102 GEO L.J. at 1360-61, 1363-65. As
a result, corrections officials sought out both
alternative sources for sodium thiopental and
substitutes for the drug.
Oklahoma made such a substitution in 2010. That
year, when it could not obtain the sodium thiopental
long used as the first drug in the sequence, Oklahoma
became the first State to use pentobarbital, a drug

13

See also Robinson v. Shanahan, 755 S.E.2d 398, 398-99
(N.C. Ct. App. 2014); Maura Dolan, California Will No Longer
Pursue Three-Drug Lethal Injections, LOS ANGELES TIMES
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/10/local/la-me-ln-lethal-inject
ion-20130710 (Jul. 10, 2013).
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used as a sedative or to control convulsions. Denno,
102 GEO. L.J. at 1362; Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336,
1340-41 (10th Cir. 2010) (rejecting challenge to
substitution of pentobarbital as the first drug in the
protocol). Other States also switched, at least temporarily, to the drug. Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1358
cht. 3. By 2011, prison officials in thirteen States
again had followed Oklahoma’s lead and permitted the
use of pentobarbital. Id.
But when the availability of pentobarbital became
questionable, prison officials turned to compounding
pharmacies to obtain it—a type of pharmacy
unregulated by the Food and Drug Administration. Id.
at 1364-71; see also In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888, 892,
895-97 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (rejecting challenge to
pentobarbital from compounding pharmacy), reh’g
denied, 741 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134
S.Ct. 1790 (2014); Whitaker v. Livingston, 732 F.3d
465, 468 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom., Yowell
v. Livingston, 134 S. Ct. 417 (2013) (same); Wellons v.
Comm’r Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th
Cir. 2014) (same); Berger, 55 B.C.L. REV. at 1381.
Compounded pentobarbital presented the additional
risk of drug contamination, which can cause
excruciating pain. Berger, 55 B.C.L. REV. at 1382-85;
Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1370-71, 1378-79 & n.329.
The risks associated with the modified approach
materialized in Oklahoma’s problematic execution of
Michael Lee Wilson in January 2014. Berger, 55
B.C.L. REV. at 1385 (describing witness accounts that
Wilson cried out during his execution, “I feel my whole
body burning!”).
Correction officials in a handful of States now have
turned to midazolam as a substitute for sodium
thiopental. See, e.g., Muhammad v. State, 132 So.3d
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176, 188 (Fla. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 894 (2014)
(Florida); Arthur v. Thomas, No. 2:11-cv-438, 2015 WL
224738, at *1-2 & n.1 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 15, 2015)
(Alabama). In 2014, four States conducted executions
using midazolam, with two States using the drug in a
three-drug protocol and the other two States using it
as part of a two-drug protocol. See Execution List
2014, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2014 (last visited
Mar. 12, 2015); see also In re Ohio Execution Protocol
Litig., 994 F. Supp. 2d 906, 909 (S.D. Ohio 2014)
(addressing Ohio’s use of midazolam in two-drug
protocol); Order, Wood v. Ryan, No. 2:14-cv-01447NVW (D. Ariz. July 24, 2014), ECF No. 34 (discussing
execution of Joseph Rudolph Wood).
Again, Oklahoma is one of these States. After the
botched execution of Michael Lee Wilson in January
2014 using pentobarbital from a compounding
pharmacy, Oklahoma substituted midazolam as the
first drug in the three-drug sequence for the execution of Clayton Lockett in April 2014.14 Berger, 55
B.C.L. REV. at 1386; Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721,
725 (10th Cir. 2015). Lockett’s execution was filled
with egregious errors, including the inability to
establish a reliable intravenous line. See Warner, 776
F.3d at 725. Although a doctor had declared Lockett
unconscious, he apparently awoke at some point. See
id.; OKLA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, THE EXECUTION OF
CLAYTON D. LOCKETT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 18 (2014)
(hereinafter “Lockett Execution Report”), available at
http:// www.dps.state.ok.us/Investigation/14-0189SI%20
Summary.pdf. Witnesses described Lockett as twitching,
14

Oklahoma’s revised protocol provides four drug combinations, two of which called for large doses of a single barbiturate—
either pentobarbital or sodium thiopental. Warner v. Gross, 776
F.3d 721, 726 (10th Cir. 2015).
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gasping, convulsing violently, and calling out. Berger,
55 B.C.L. REV. at 1386. Prison officials discovered that
the intravenous line had not worked as intended and
some of the drugs had absorbed into Lockett’s tissue
or leaked out. See id.; Locket Execution Report at 1112, 18-19; Warner, 776 F.3d at 725. State officials
attempted to stop the execution, but Lockett died
forty-three minutes after the first injection. See
Lockett Execution Report at 18; Berger, 55 B.C.L. REV.
at 1386; Warner, 776 F.3d at 725.
Oklahoma
investigated the botched execution, but still
maintained the use of midazolam even though the
drug does not have the same anesthetic properties as
sodium thiopental. Berger, 55 B.C.L. REV. at 1386;
Pet. Br. 19-22.
As a result of a flurry of changes to execution
protocols, prison officials used four different drug
combinations in lethal injection executions in 2014
alone.15 The quick switches to new drugs stand in
stark contrast to the consensus in support of the threedrug protocol at issue in Baze, which States had relied
upon for more than thirty years.

15

See Execution List 2014, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2014 (last visited
Mar. 12, 2015). The four drug combinations were: (1) a threedrug protocol using midazolam; (2) a three-drug protocol using
pentobarbital; (3) a two-drug protocol using midazolam and
hydromorphone; and (4) a one-drug protocol using pentobarbital.
Id.
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III. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF PRISON OFFICIALS’ ADMINISTRATION OF LETHAL
INJECTION IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT.
As the history demonstrates, States adopted lethal
injection generally and the three-drug protocol
specifically without serious study or independent
analysis. States uniformly followed Oklahoma in
delegating to prison officials the details of lethal
injections.
Historical practice and contemporary
evidence indicate that prison officials likely lack the
necessary expertise to develop lethal injection
protocols and fail to rely upon scientific or medical
study. Yet these prison officials, operating outside the
public eye, are tasked with developing procedures by
which inmates will be executed. Because legislatures
have delegated responsibility for such protocols to
unelected officials, it is imperative that courts not
insulate a State’s protocol against challenge. Rather,
the judiciary must provide a check on the exercise of
such authority. In light of the recent trend toward
constantly changing protocols, the courts have the
constitutional
responsibility
to
ensure
such
procedures comport with the Eighth Amendment.
A. Judicial Examination Of Modifications
To Protocols Is Necessary Because The
Actions Of Prison Officials Are Not
Subject To Public Scrutiny And
Oversight.
For a quarter century, States followed the threedrug protocol this Court approved in Baze. But prison
officials did not arrive at the three-drug protocol
after independent analysis and evaluation. Rather,

27
the protocol was “the product of administrative
convenience and a stereotyped reaction to an issue,
rather than a careful analysis of relevant
considerations favoring or disfavoring a conclusion.”
Baze, 553 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact,
“[i]n the majority of States that use the three-drug
protocol, the drugs were selected by unelected department of correction officials with no specialized medical
knowledge and without the benefit of expert assistance or guidance.” Id. at 74-75.
Following Baze, States “have changed their lethal
injection protocols in inconsistent ways that bear little
resemblance to the original protocol evaluated in Baze
and even differ from one execution to the next within
the same state.” Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1331. Rather
than correct for the unreasoned manner in which
protocols had been adopted in the past, however,
officials prioritize concern for administrative convenience over the need for a humane execution. Thus, as
with the original three-drug protocol, such changes are
not the result of careful deliberation. For this reason,
“their drug selections are not entitled to the kind of
deference afforded legislative decisions.” Baze, 553
U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Prison officials in Oklahoma fall into this general
pattern. Oklahoma first adopted pentobarbital for
executions without any reasoned analysis. Pavatt, 627
F.3d at 1337; Pet. Br. at 11. Oklahoma then used
pentobarbital from a compounding pharmacy, despite
the well-documented risks associated with such
pharmacies. Berger, 55 B.C.L. REV. at 1385. When
pentobarbital became unavailable, Oklahoma prison
officials turned to midazolam because Florida had
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used the drug. Pet. Br. at 11. Oklahoma’s reliance on
another State’s protocol without independent evaluation mirrored other States’ adoption of Oklahoma’s
three-drug protocol nearly four decades ago.
Under these circumstances, judicial review provides
a necessary means by which to examine the constitutionality of the chosen lethal injection drugs,
procedures, and administration. See, e.g., Morales,
465 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (holding California’s protocol
unconstitutional); Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 895,
903 (ruling State’s failure to adopt one-drug protocol
recommend by state-commissioned study violated the
Eighth Amendment); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 2:07-cv04129, 2006 WL 1779035, at *8 (W.D. Mo. June 26,
2006), rev’d, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding
that Missouri’s lethal injection procedure presented
unconstitutional risk due to maladministration).
Following Baze, however, challenges to lethal injection protocols were cut short in misplaced reliance on
the decision. Indeed, a majority of the cases cite the
“Baze substantial-risk standard to establish that the
method of injection and the drugs administered did
not pose a risk sufficient to constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation.” Denno, 102 GEO L.J. at 1349.
Reliance on this aspect of Baze persisted in spite of
numerous changes to lethal injection protocols. Id.
But the plurality opinion in Baze did not seek to
insulate lethal injection protocols from scrutiny. Baze,
553 U.S. at 62. The opinion specifically contemplated
changes to the method “in light of new developments,
to ensure humane capital punishment.” Id.
Although the Court anticipated legislative changes,
Baze, 553 U.S. at 62, the types of challenges at issue
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in Baze (concerning the risk of improper administration) and here (concerning drug selection) do not
involve matters on which legislatures historically have
spoken. While the courts need not serve as “boards of
inquiry charged with determining ‘best practices’ for
executions,” id. at 51 (plurality op.), each new combination of drugs must be evaluated independently.
Such judicial oversight would not “substantially
intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing their execution procedures,” id., because legislatures do not concern themselves with the intricacies of
lethal injection procedures.16 Thus, as Justice Stevens
explained, “[t]he question whether a similar threedrug protocol may be used in other States remains
open, and may well be answered differently in a future
case on the basis of a more complete record.” Id. at 71
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
The development of such records is critical. History
demonstrates that the lethal injection protocols that
16

Recently, legislatures that have proposed bills addressing
execution methods have sought to bring back methods of
execution abandoned in favor of lethal injection. Oklahoma is
considering a bill that would revive a modified form of lethal gas
using nitrogen instead of cyanide. See, e.g., Sean Murphy,
Nitrogen Gas Executions Approved By Oklahoma, ABC NEWS,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/nitrogen-gas-executions-ap
proved-oklahoma-house-29354885 (Mar. 3, 2015 4:14 p.m.). The
Utah Senate approved a statutory amendment that would allow
the State to use the firing squad if the State cannot obtain lethal
injection drugs. Kelly Catalfamo & Michelle L. Price, Utah
Lawmakers Vote to Allow Firing Squad, ABC NEWS, http://
abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/lawmakers-vote-state-firing-squad29542718 (Mar. 11, 2015 12:48 a.m.). And Tennessee amended
its statute to allow for the use of electrocution if the drugs for
lethal injection are not available. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23114(e)(2).
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prison officials created embodied constitutionally
unacceptable risks. Even when faced with evidence of
botched executions involving the exact same combination of drugs, States have proceeded to use the
protocol. Closer examination of such procedures was
(and remains) hindered and, in some cases, foreclosed
by the secretive nature in which prison officials
develop and ultimately carry out their lethal injection
protocols. Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 121-23;
Berger, 55 B.C.L. REV. at 1388-95.
Thoughtful
examination will continue only if this Court reinforces
the necessity of Eighth Amendment review of prison
officials’ chosen lethal injection drugs and procedures.
B. The Delegation Of Lethal Injection
Procedures To Prison Officials Permits
Corrective Revision Of Protocols To
Ensure Compliance With The Eighth
Amendment.
Although the delegation to prison officials of the
details of lethal injection means that protocols require
careful judicial scrutiny, such delegation also provides
States with the flexibility to adjust protocols if a court
deems an aspect unconstitutional. Thus, no reason
exists to require an inmate to identify a specific
alternative to a challenged protocol. To the contrary,
legislatures and courts should not be permitted to
transfer the responsibility for an execution that
comports with the Eighth Amendment to the
condemned inmate.
When Oklahoma first declined to include the details
of the protocol in its lethal injection statute in 1977, it
did so with the idea that different drug combinations
might become available. Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
at 67.
In recent years, this remnant of the adoption of
lethal injection has permitted inmates to challenge the
specific lethal injection procedures promulgated by
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prison officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
governs challenges to circumstances of confinement.
In such actions, a ruling deeming a protocol unconstitutional would not render lethal injection itself
unconstitutional because States’ lethal injection statutes do not embody the specifics of lethal injection
procedures.
In Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004), this
Court permitted to proceed as a Section 1983 claim a
challenge by a condemned inmate to the planned use
of a cut-down procedure—a painful and invasive way
to establish intravenous access. Id. at 642-46. The
Court explained the suit was allowed because the
petitioner did not seek to challenge lethal injection
itself, but rather challenged only the cut-down
procedure. Id.
Two year later, in Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573
(2006), the petitioner inmate challenged the constitutionality of Florida’s three-drug protocol. The Court
held that challenges to state protocols were permissible Section 1983 actions because success “would not
necessarily prevent the State from executing [the
inmate] by lethal injection.” Id. at 580.
And Baze concerned whether the non-drug aspects
of Kentucky’s protocol presented an unnecessary risk
of pain and suffering if the three-drug protocol were
not administered properly. Baze, 553 U.S. at 40
(explaining that petitioners contended only that
Kentucky’s protocol violated the Eight Amendment
“because of the risk that the protocol’s terms might not
be properly followed, resulting in significant pain”).
In this regard, because legislatures delegate to
prison officials the details of lethal injection executions, a State retains the flexibility to implement an
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alternative to its chosen procedure if needed.17 State
corrections officials have demonstrated over time the
ability to respond to a variety of practical concerns and
have the same ability to respond to constitutional
concerns if required to do so. See Hill, 547 U.S. at 58081 (explaining that Florida “leaves implementation [of
lethal injection] to the department of corrections,” and
“does not require the department of corrections to use
the challenged procedure,” thereby “leav[ing] the State
free to use an alternative lethal injection procedure”)
(citing Fla. Stat. §§ 922.105(1), (7)); see also Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 213 (2007) (describing Hill as
“unanimously reject[ing] a proposal that § 1983 suits
challenging a method of execution must identify an
acceptable alternative”).
In this way, the intentional vagueness of lethal
injection statutes allows prison officials to take
corrective action if a certain protocol is found
unconstitutional. Accordingly, challenges to lethal
injection protocols should not be restricted to
instances in which an inmate can identify a specific
available alternative.

17

A protocol may be subject to some scrutiny through state
administrative enactment procedures, but certain States exempt
lethal injection protocols from review. Compare Sims v. Dep’t of
Corr. & Rehab., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 409, 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)
(invalidating protocol for failure to comply with state administrative procedure act) and Bowling v. Kentucky Dep’t of Corr., 301
S.W.3d 478, 492 (Ky. 2010) (similar) with Hill v. Owens, 738
S.E.2d 56, 64 (Ga. 2013) (holding state administrative procedure
act did not apply to lethal injection protocol, “specifically the
choice of the drug or drugs that are appropriate at any given
time”) and Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 311-12
(Tenn. 2005) (noting lethal injection protocol exemption from
state administrative procedure act).
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Tenth Circuit should be
reversed.
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